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Strategies for Union Growth In 
Food Manufacturing and Agriculture 
RICHARD W. H U R D 
Whittemore School of Business and Economics, University of New Hampshire 
The labor force and employment conditions in agriculture differ 
[ considerably from those in food manufacturing. Furthermore, union-
ization in agriculture is at an embryonic stage, while in food manu-
; facturing it is well established. Because of these dissimilarities pros-
:<• pects for union growth are not the same and the two industries are 
treated separately below. 
Agriculture1 
Until recent years meaningful union activity among agricultural 
workers was virtually nonexistent in spite of numerous organizing 
drives sponsored by established trade unions. Barriers inhibiting union 
organizing in agriculture include the extreme poverty of the workers, 
the lack of job securty, and the migrant nature of the work force. 
Compounding these problems, agriculatural workers are not protected 
by federal labor laws. 
The United Farm Workers of America (UFWA), the outgrowth 
of a community organization started by California farmworkers in 
the early 1960's, has proved to be a proficient organizer of agricultural 
labor. The potential for union growth in agriculture rests with the 
UFWA. A look at the reasons for the UFWA's success provides a set 
of guidelines for further organizing among agricultural workers. Based 
on recent experience it is reasonable to assume that the Teamsters, the 
only other union active in agriculture, also benefit from UFWA orga-
nizing activity. 
UFWA STRATEGIES AND ALLIANCES 
The UFWA signed its first contract in 1966 and expanded steadily 
until the spring of 1973, when 42 thousand agricultural workers in 
three states and a variety of crops were covered by UFWA contracts. 
Sixty thousand additional workers have signed union authorization 
cards but the UFWA has not yet been officially recognized as their 
bargaining agent. 
x T h e following discussion of union activity in agriculture is based in part on 
Richard Hurd, "Organizing the Working Poor—the California Grape Strike Experi-
ence," Review of Radical Political Economics, forthcoming. 
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The UFWA's organizing success among low income agricultural 
workers derives from its dual status as both a union and a community 
organization. Rather than being concerned solely with work-related 
problems, the UFWA concentrates on satisfying all of the needs of its 
members. The union performs service work, assisting members with 
welfare and food stamp applications, social security and income tax 
forms, legal problems, and difficulties encountered with landlords and 
creditors. In addition the union operates several health clinics, a credit 
union, a cooperative store, a cooperative service station, and a child 
care center, and provides low cost medical and life insurance. Because 
agricultural workers are members of the poverty class, involvement 
in the satisfaction of non-work-related needs is mandatory if a union 
of these workers is to be viable. 
The UFWA's union activity has also demonstrated a primary 
concern with the needs of the workers. Its insistence on limitations N 
of pesticide use because of workers' health delayed settlement of the 
widely publicized table grape strike for a full year until growers finally 
agreed to far-reaching pesticide restrictions. Another important pro-
vision of all UFWA contracts is the union hiring hall. This is espe-
cially important because it undermines the labor contractor system 
through which agricultural workers have traditionally been employed. 
Under this system the grower arranges for a labor contractor to supply 
the required workers. The contractor hires the workers and possesses 
an all-pervasive control over them, frequently providing transpor-
tation, housing, and food for migrants, then subtracting inflated costs 
for these services from the workers' paychecks. By requiring a union 
hiring hall the UFWA has been able to eliminate this system and 
insure fair and equitable treatment for all workers. 
By combining community and union organizing, the UFWA has 
been able to both achieve grass roots participation and attack the 
cause of the workers' poverty. However, because of the poverty of the 
workers and the resulting economic weakness of the union, support 
from outside sources was a prerequisite for the UFWA's success. An 
important tactical decision was to rely on consumer boycotts as a means 
to gain economic power. T o assure the success of the boycotts, a num-
ber of important allies have been cultivated. As a union, employing 
union tactics and allying itself with established union organizations 
(most notably the American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations [AFL-CIO] and the United Automobile Work-
ers [UAW]), the UFWA has secured the cooperation of unionized 
working class people nationwide. The UFWA's reliance on the methods 
of the civil rights movement, its association with left leaning members 
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of Congress, and its image as a champion of the poor have led political 
liberals to participate in boycott activity. The UFWA has also empha-
sized its role as a Chicano union, aligning itself with other minority 
group organizations and receiving support from minority group mem-
bers. 
T H E TEAMSTER INCURSION 
In the summer of 1970, as the table grape strike and boycott drew 
successfully to a close, the UFWA launched an organizing campaign 
among California's lettuce workers. Shortly after the campaign began, 
most of the lettuce growers announced that they had signed contracts 
with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT). Then in 
the spring and summer of 1973 when the UFWA's three year table grape 
contracts expired, the IBT signed with a majority of the grape growers. 
These two sets of contracts represent the extent of IBT involvement 
in agriculture. 
The IBT did not win these contracts by organizing the workers, 
who by all indications favor the UFWA, but by "organizing" the 
growers. In fact, the IBT's willingness to sign contracts covering 
agricultural workers was welcomed, if not encouraged, by the growers 
who faced the alternative of recognizing the UFWA as bargaining 
agent. Although wages and benefits are approximately the same under 
the contracts signed by the two unions, there are two important dif-
ferences in the agreements. The IBT contracts do not contain the 
extensive pesticide restrictions included in the UFWA contracts, nor 
do they call for union hiring halls. T o the UFWA, with their commit-
ment to the subordination of production to the needs of the workers, 
these two provisions are the most important clauses in their contracts. 
T o the growers, these provisions are unacceptable because they hinder 
their ability to control production.2 The growers clearly prefer the 
cooperative IBT over the antagonistic UFWA. 
In the fall of 1973, with George Meany serving as a mediator, the 
UFWA and IBT reached a tentative jurisdictional agreement which 
would have brought an end to IBT union activity in agriculture. 
However, the IBT recently announced that they would not honor the 
agreement.3 
POTENTIAL FOR GROWTH 
With over two million agriculture industry employees who do not 
3
 For a more detailed discussion of the importance of control over the production 
process see Andre Gorz, Strategy for Labor (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967). 
3
 "Meany Details Record of Teamster Farm Raid," AFL-CIO News, XVIII (De-
cember 1, 1973), p . 1. 
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belong to unions,* the UFWA and IBT have barely scratched the 
surface. The most promising approach for organizing low income 
agricultural workers is the UFWA's combination of community and 
union organizing. UFWA organizers are currently active all over 
California and in Arizona, Oregon, and Washington. Support is so 
widespread that UFWA officials have forewarned that a general strike 
in California agriculture is possible for next summer. Because com-
munity organizing is most effective where there are workers in year 
around residence, the greatest potential for UFWA type organizing 
east of the Rockies lies in Texas and Florida, the originating points 
for the Midwestern and Eastern migrant streams respectively. 
Unless they shift from their "organize the growers" approach, the 
IBT's opportunity for expanding membership in agriculture lies with 
the UFWA. Where the UFWA has successfully organized the workers, 
most growers will turn to the IBT as a lesser evil. 
The IBT's incursion into agriculture is unfortunate. Their pres-
ence will undoubtedly slow down union growth, since much of the 
UFWA's time and energy will necessarily be spent trying to regain 
contracts lost to the IBT. However, there is no indication at this time 
that the IBT will break the UFWA, especially with the extensive 
financial support being provided the UFWA by the AFL-CIO. 
In recent years there has been substantial support in Congress for 
an amendment to Taft-Hartley extending its coverage to include agri-
cultural workers, and there is a good possibility that such an amend-
ment will be approved within the next few years. Coverage under 
Taft-Hartley, with agricultural workers' rights to choose a bargaining 
representative thus protected, would no doubt lead to an expansion 
of UFWA membership, in some cases at the expense of the IBT. How-
ever, the Taft-Hartley prohibition of secondary boycotts would inhibit 
the UFWA's economic power, and the prohibition of union hiring 
halls would limit the UFWA's contract demands. 
Due to steady advances in mechanization, agricultural employ-
ment declined almost 40 percent from 1960 to 1970.5 Employment 
reductions are expected to continue, which will eat into union mem-
bership in areas where workers are already organized. At the same 
time, however, mechanization will increase the potential for unioniza-
tion among the workers who remain because they will be more highly 
skilled and less transient. 
* U.S., Bureau of the Census, Nineteenth Decennial Census of the United States: 
1970. Population, I, p . 798. 
5
 loc. cit. 
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Food Manufacturing 
Food manufacturing is made up of several distinct industries (meat 
packing, baking, breakfast cereal, etc.), with market conditions and 
the extent of unionization varying considerably from one industry 
to the next. T o further complicate the picture, 25 different unions 
represent food manufacturing employees.6 In spite of the diversity 
some general observations can be made concerning the potential for 
union growth. 
Food manufacturing is one of the more highly organized industrial 
sectors, with approximately two-thirds of production workers union-
ized.7 The one food industry with considerable promise for uniori 
expansion is fruit and vegetable processing, which is for the most part 
unorganized except on the West Coast. Employees of food processing 
plants face some of the same conditions as agricultural workers, 
namely low wages and seasonal work. Because of these similarities 
food industry unions active among processing plant workers should 
consider adopting the UFWA model, combining union and community 
organizing. 
Another relatively unorganized group of workers consists of south-
ern food manufacturing employees. The organizing problems which 
arise in the south are well known and affect virtually all industries. 
Most food industry unions have used traditional organizing techniques 
in the south, stressing the improvements in wages and benefits which 
unions deliver, with little success. A notable exception is the Retail 
Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU), which represents 
the primarily black work force in several Alabama food processing 
plants. RWDSU involvement in the civil rights movement in Alabama 
laid the groundwork for this organizing accomplishment. Following 
the RWDSU example, other food industry unions should consider 
going beyond typical organizing and should concern themselves with 
the particular needs and problems of southern workers, black and 
white, in order to erase their fear of unions and their distrust of 
"yankee" union organizers. 
IMPACT OF MECHANIZATION ON UNION GROWTH 
The most important problem facing unions in food manufacturing 
is mechanization. From 1960 to 1970 employment declined almost 
"U.S., Bureau of Labor Statistics, Directory of National Unions and Employee 
Associations 1971, Bulletin No. 1750, 1972, p . 80. The unions with more than ten 
thousand members in food manufacturing are the Bakery and Confectionery Work-
ers, the Distillery Workers, the Grain Millers, the Meat Cutters, the Retail Whole-
sale and Department Store Union, and the Teamsters. 
7
 ibid., p . 81 
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25 percent in the food industry compared to a seven percent employ-
ment increase in manufacturing as a whole.8 This employment decline 
is expected to continue. In spite of losses due to mechanization major 
food industry unions have been able to maintain fairly stable mem-
bership levels through actively organizing the unorganized. 
The prevailing attitude of union leaders is to accept mechanization 
in the food industry as a fact of life. They have responded with an 
attempt to soften the impact of mechanization on individual union 
members by bargaining for increased separation pay, early retirement, 
shorter work weeks, and in some cases retraining programs and trans-
fer rights. This approach is aimed at forcing food manufacturing 
firms to bear the social costs of mechanization (namely the unemploy-
ment which results) and is understandable in the framework of 
orthodox economics. 
The . non-resistance of unions to mechanization derives from the 
prevalent attitude that mechanization is the natural result of tech-
nological change and is merely a reflection of the efficiency orientation 
of business. This narrow view has clouded the total picture, for be-
hind these efficiency incentives lie power incentives. Union leaders 
and economists need to look beyond efficiency and consider the impact .• 
of mechanization on the social relations in production.9 \ 
Mechanization clearly weakens workers (and unions) vis-a-vis i 
capital (and management). As Baumgartner and Burns observe, \ 
"While management is in a position . . . to create an alternative to J 
labor in the form of machinery, . . . labor is generally unable to estab- -j 
lish an alternative to the means of production controlled by man- | 
agement. This inequality in options assures employers dominant 1 
power over labor."10 The most important part of the social relations J 
between management and unions is control over the production pro- J 
cess. Mechanization increases management's control. fj 
With rapid mechanization the work rules negotiated by unions \ 
are eliminated. Unions are forced to concentrate their efforts on ] 
reducing the negative effects of technological change on employment. I 
As a result it is not until mechanization stabilizes and unions are able i 
to adjust to new job descriptions and work assignments that attention 
is again focused on establishing work rules in order to adapt production \ 
to the needs of the workers. I 
8U.S., Bureau of the Census, op. cit. j 
9
 For a discussion of the historical evolution of the social relations of production 1 
see Stephen Marglin, "What Do Bosses Do?" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, \ 
August 1971). (Mimeographed.) ,| 
10
 Tom Baumgartner and Tom Burns, "Employer/Employee Power Relations, Cap- J 
italist Institutions, and Wage Levels" (Durham, N.H.: University of New Hampshire, j 
Novmeber, 1973), p. II. (Mimeographed.) •'! 
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Typically food industry unions have conceded to management the 
right to make decisions regarding mechanization, trading control over 
production and employment for higher wages. As a result workers 
sacrifice what little influence they have over their jobs. Furthermore 
the relative power position of unions is worsened as management 
authority increases. If food manufacturing unions are to increase 
their membership and expand their power, they must develop a more 
aggressive strategy. This is not to say that unions should attempt to 
halt technological change. Rather, mechanization should be more 
carefully planned and, because they are profoundly affected, workers 
should participate in the decision-making process. 
It is obvious that management will not grant workers an equal (or 
even subordinate) voice in mechanization decisions, for by making 
such a concession they would sacrifice their dominant position in the 
socal relations of production. Currently, unions in food manufac-
turing (with the possible exception of the Teamsters) do not have 
the necessary power to force such a change, and thus must find ways 
to improve their position. As a first step they should fight for restric-
tive work rules in order to regain parity in the power relationship 
with management. Furthermore, these unions should consider merging, 
or should at least establish formal cooperation. 
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OP UNION MERGERS 
During the 1960's most of the organizing efforts of food manufac-
turing unions were wasted on raiding and jurisdictional disputes. 
Three recent horizontal mergers in meat packing (Meat Gutters and 
Packinghouse Workers), baking (Bakery and Confectionery Workers, 
and American Bakery and Confectionery Workers), and brewing 
(Brewery Workers and Teamsters) have eliminated most of the need-
less and divisive competition among food manufacturing unions. This 
should result in more effective organizing of the unorganized since 
resources have been pooled and competition has been replaced by 
cooperation. Future horizontal mergers would have a similar impact.11 
As important as horizontal mergers are, however, vertical mergers 
(from the farm to the retail store) would contribute more to union 
power. With vertical integration, coordination of union activities at 
different stages of food production and distribution would be facil-
itated, and unions could make para-legal use of secondary strikes and 
11
 Jerry Wurf, vice-president of the AFL-CIO, is a strong proponent of mergers 
because of the organizing gains which would result. Jerry Wurf, "Labor's Battle 
With Itself," The Washington Post, October 14, 1973, p . CI. 
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secondary boycotts.12 These weapons would greatly augment the arsenal 
of food manufacturing unions and would make the erection of restric-
tive work rules and the acquisition of a voice in mechanization decisions 
attainable objectives. 
Most unions in the food sector support the principle of mergers. 
However, further mergers among major food industry unions are 
unlikely in the near future because of political differences between 
unions and because union leaders seem unwilling to sacrifice their own 
power and prestige even in the interest of a stronger trade union 
movement. 
Because merger prospects are not especially bright, attention should 
be focused on the formation of closer alliances. Mutual aid pacts, 
coordinated bargaining, joint organizing campaigns, and no raid agree-
ments would promote organizing of the unorganized and would re-
enforce the power of individual unions vis-a-vis management. The 
Meat Cutters and Teamsters have long worked in such a cooperative 
way, and both have benefited. Other food manufacturing unions 
should set petty differences aside and follow their example. 
MThe Teamsters have successfully used such leverage techniques for years. For a 
detailed discussion of the bargaining power thus created, see Estelle James and Ralph 
James, "Hoffa's Leverage Techniques in Bargaining," Industrial Relations III (Oc-
tober, 1963), pp. 73-93. 
